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THE MODAL LOGIC OF FORCING
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND BENEDIKT LO¨WE
Abstract. A set theoretical assertion ψ is forceable or possible,
written 3ψ, if ψ holds in some forcing extension, and necessary,
written 2ψ, if ψ holds in all forcing extensions. In this forcing
interpretation of modal logic, we establish that if zfc is consistent,
then the zfc-provable principles of forcing are exactly those in the
modal theory S4.2.
1. Introduction
What are the most general principles in set theory relating forceabil-
ity and truth? We are interested in how the set theoretical method of
forcing affects the first order theory of a model of set theory. As with
Solovay’s celebrated analysis of provability, both this question and its
answer are naturally formulated with modal logic.1 We aim to do for
forceability what Solovay did for provability.
Forcing was introduced by Paul Cohen in 1962 in order to prove the
independence of the Axiom of Choice ac and the Continuum Hypoth-
esis ch from the other axioms of set theory. In an explosion of ap-
plications, set theorists subsequently used it to construct an enormous
variety of models of set theory and prove many other independence
results. With forcing one builds an extension of any model V of set
theory, in an algebraic manner akin to a field extension, by adjoining
a new ideal object G, a V -generic filter over a partial order P in the
ground model V , while preserving zfc. The resulting forcing extension
V [G] is closely related to the ground model V , but may exhibit different
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in January and February 2005. The authors would like to thank Nick Bezhanishvili
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1[Sol76]; for a survey of the result and the subsequent development of the field
of provability logic, see also [JdJ98].
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set theoretical truths in a way that can often be carefully controlled.
The method has become a fundamental tool in set theory.
Because the ground model V has some access via names and the
forcing relation to the objects and truths of the forcing extension V [G],
there are clear affinities between forcing and modal logic. (One might
even imagine the vast collection of all models of set theory, related
by forcing, as an enormous Kripke model.) Accordingly, we define
that a statement of set theory ϕ is forceable or possible if ϕ holds in
some forcing extension, and ϕ is necessary if it holds in all forcing
extensions. The modal notation 3ϕ and 2ϕ expresses, respectively,
that ϕ is possible or necessary. This forcing interpretation of modal
logic was introduced by the first author in [Ham03] in connection with
the Maximality Principle, a new forcing axiom, with related work in
[Lei04] and [HW05]. An alternative but related connection between
modal logic and forcing was explored by Fitting and Smullyan in [SF96],
and Blass [Bla90] provides an interpretation of modal logic in set theory
that is not directly related to forcing.
These modal operators, of course, are eliminable in the language
of set theory, because their meaning can be expressed in the usual
language of set theory by means of the forcing relation or Boolean
values. For example, 3ϕ simply means that there is some partial
order P and condition p ∈ P such that p P ϕ, and 2ϕ means that for
all partial orders P and p ∈ P we have p P ϕ. In this way, one can
interpret 3ϕ and 2ϕ in any model of set theory.2 In zfc we may freely
use a mixed language of set theory with the modal operators 3 and 2,
understood with the forcing interpretation. While the modal operators
3 and 2 are eliminable, we nevertheless retain them, because our goal
is to discover which modal principles forcing must obey.
For example, it is easy to see that 2ϕ → ϕ is a valid principle of
forcing, because if ϕ is true in all forcing extensions, then it is true, as
the universe is a (trivial) forcing extension of itself. Similarly, ¬3ϕ↔
2¬ϕ is valid for forcing because a statement ϕ is not forceable if and
only if all forcing extensions satisfy ¬ϕ. The principle 2ϕ→ 22ϕ is
2By formalizing forcing in zfc, rather than the metatheory, one can sensibly
force over any model of zfc, without needing it to be countable or transitive and
regardless of the metatheoretical objects, such as generic filters, which may or may
not exist in a larger universe. In this syntactic account, one considers what is forced
by various conditions without ever building the forcing extension as a structure. A
semantic account of forcing over an arbitraryM |= zfc is provided by the quotient
MP/U of the Boolean valued universe MP by any ultrafilter U , with no need for
U to be M -generic (even U ∈M works fine!); since M maps elementarily into the
ground model of MP/U , one has the forcing extension as an actual structure.
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valid because if ϕ holds in all forcing extensions, then so does 2ϕ, since
any forcing extension of a forcing extension is a forcing extension. The
reader may easily verify that 2(ϕ→ ψ)→ (2ϕ→ 2ψ) is valid. The
principle 3 2ϕ → 23ϕ is valid for forcing, because if ϕ is necessary
in V P and V Q is an arbitrary extension, then ϕ is true in the product
extension V P×Q, as this extends V P; consequently, ϕ is forceable over
every such extension V Q. These modal assertions axiomatize the modal
theory known as S4.2, and a bit of formalization will help us express
what we have observed. A modal assertion is a formula of propositional
modal logic, such as (2 q0 → q0), expressed with propositional variables
qi, Boolean connectives ∧, ∨, ¬, →, ↔ and the modal operators 3,2.
Main Definition 1. A modal assertion ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) is a valid prin-
ciple of forcing if for all sentences ψi in the language of set theory,
ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) holds under the forcing interpretation of 3 and 2.
More specifically, ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) is a zfc-provable principle of forcing
if zfc proves all such substitution instances ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). This nat-
urally generalizes to larger theories with the notion of a T -provable
principle of forcing. For any model W |= zfc, the modal assertion
ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) is a valid principle of forcing in W if all substitution in-
stances ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) are true in W . So ϕ is a valid principle of forcing
if it is valid in the universe V of all sets (this is expressed as a scheme),
and the zfc-provable principles of forcing are those provable in zfc,
as schemes, to be valid.
Main Question 2. What are the valid principles of forcing?
For the zfc-provable principles of forcing, our Main Theorem 6 pro-
vides the answer. Meanwhile, a few paragraphs ago, we essentially
observed the following.
Theorem 3. Every assertion in the modal theory S4.2 is a zfc-provable
principle of forcing.
Proof. The modal theory S4.2 is obtained from the axioms
K 2(ϕ→ ψ)→ (2ϕ→ 2ψ)
Dual ¬3ϕ↔ 2¬ϕ
S 2ϕ→ ϕ
4 2ϕ→ 22ϕ
.2 3 2ϕ→ 23ϕ
by closing under modus ponens and necessitation (from ϕ, deduce 2ϕ).
We observed earlier that each axiom is a valid principle of forcing. The
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zfc-provable principles of forcing are clearly closed under modus po-
nens, and they are closed under necessitation because if ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)
holds in all models of set theory, then so does 2ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). 
Let us quickly show that none of the modal theories most commonly
considered beyond S4.2 are zfc-provable principles of forcing. This
follows from our main theorem, but we find it informative to have
explicit failing instances of the principles; they are what pointed to
S4.2 as the right choice.
5 3 2ϕ→ ϕ
M 23ϕ→ 32ϕ
W5 3 2ϕ→ (ϕ→ 2ϕ)
.3 3ϕ ∧3ψ → (3(ϕ ∧3ψ) ∨3(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨3(ψ ∧3ϕ))
Dm 2(2(ϕ→ 2ϕ)→ ϕ)→ (3 2ϕ→ ϕ)
Grz 2(2(ϕ→ 2ϕ)→ ϕ)→ ϕ
Lo¨b 2(2ϕ→ ϕ)→ 2ϕ
H ϕ→ 2(3ϕ→ ϕ)
Observation 4. If zfc is consistent, then none of the above assertions
is a zfc-provable principle of forcing.
Proof. (5) Let ϕ be the assertion “ωL1 is countable,” where L denotes
Go¨del’s constructible universe. Since the class L is absolute to all
forcing extensions, the expression ωL1 refers to the same ordinal in all
forcing extensions. Since forcing can collapse ω1 (see [Jec03, 14.3]), and
it can never be uncollapsed, 3 2ϕ holds in any model of zfc. But ϕ
is false in L, so 5 is not valid for forcing over L.
(M) This is the McKinsey axiom, also known as .1. The Continuum
Hypothesis ch is forceable over any model of set theory (see [Jec03,
ex. 15.15]), so 23ch holds. But ¬ch is also forceable ([Jec03, 14.32]),
so 3 2ch fails. Thus, M is invalid for forcing in every model of zfc.
(W5) Let ϕ be the assertion “ωL1 < ω1 or ch,” which is true in L,
but not necessary there, since one can force ¬ch without collapsing
ωL1 . Since one could collapse ω
L
1 , however, ϕ is forceably necessary in
any model of set theory. Thus, 32ϕ holds in L, but not ϕ → 2ϕ,
and so W5 fails as a principle of forcing in L.
(.3) Let ϕ assert “ωL1 is collapsed, but not ω
L
2 ” and ψ assert “ω
L
2 is
collapsed, but not ωL1 .” These are each forceable over L, since ω
L
1 and
ωL2 can be collapsed independently. Yet, whenever one of them holds,
the other becomes unforceable. So the antecedent of this instance of .3
is true in L, while the conclusion is false, so .3 is not valid in L.
(Dm) This axiom is also known as Dum. Let ϕ assert “ωL1 < ω1
or ch,” as in case (W5). We observed that ϕ is possibly necessary,
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but false in L, so L |= ¬(32ϕ → ϕ), falsifying the conclusion of
this instance of Dm. For the antecedent, suppose a forcing extension
satisfies LP |= ωL1 = ω1. Since ch is forceable over L
P without collapsing
ωL1 , we conclude L
P |= ¬2(ϕ → 2ϕ). It follows vacuously that LP |=
2(ϕ → 2ϕ) → ϕ. Alternatively, if LP |= ωL1 < ω1, then ϕ is true
there, so LP |= 2(ϕ → 2ϕ) → ϕ. Thus, every forcing extension
satisfies 2(ϕ→ 2ϕ)→ ϕ, and so L |= 2(2(ϕ→ 2ϕ)→ ϕ), fulfilling
the antecedent of Dm in L. So Dm is not valid for forcing over L.
(Grz) This is the Grzegorczyk axiom. Since Grz is stronger than
Dm, it is invalid in L by the previous case. We will show, however,
that Grz is invalid in every model of set theory. Let ϕ be the ch. Since
¬ch is forceable over any model of set theory, 2ϕ is always false, and
so ϕ → 2ϕ is equivalent to ¬ϕ. So this instance of Grz reduces to
2(2¬ch → ch) → ch. Since ch is always forceable, 2¬ch is false,
making the first implication, and the hypothesis of this instance of
Grz, vacuously true. So this axiom will fail whenever ch fails. Similar
reasoning shows that if ϕ is ¬ch, then the axiom fails if ch holds. So
Grz fails as a principle of forcing in every model of set theory.
(Lo¨b) This axiom expresses the content of Lo¨b’s theorem in prov-
ability logic, where one interprets 2ϕ as “ϕ is provable.” Under the
forcing interpretation, however, it is invalid. If ϕ is ch, then 2ϕ is
always false, so 2(2ϕ → ϕ) is always true. So in any model of set
theory, the hypothesis of this instance of the Lo¨b axiom is true, while
the conclusion is false. So Lo¨b is never a valid principle of forcing.
(H) Let ϕ be the ch. As we have mentioned, this is necessarily
possible, so 3ϕ always holds. In this case, therefore, 2(3ϕ → ϕ) is
equivalent to 2ϕ, which is false. So H fails in any model where ch is
true. By using ¬ch in the other models, we conclude that H fails as a
principle of forcing in every model of set theory. 
The corresponding modal theories, listed below with their implica-
tion diagram, are obtained by closing the axioms under modus ponens,
substitution and necessitation. This list is not exhaustive, as there are
continuum many modal theories above S4.2 that are not listed. We
refer the reader to [CZ97] and [BdRV01] for excellent developments of
modal logic, including the analysis of these and many other theories.
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Some Common Modal Theories
S5 = S4 + 5
S4W5 = S4 +W5
S4.3 = S4 + .3
S4.2.1 = S4 + .2 +M
S4.2 = S4 + .2
S4.1 = S4 +M
S4 = K4 + S
Dm.2 = S4.2 +Dm
Dm = S4 +Dm
Grz = K +Grz = S4 +Grz
GL = K4 + Lo¨b
K4H = K4 +H
K4 = K + 4
K = K+Dual
S5
S4W5
?
Q
Q
Qs
S4.2.1 S4.3
?
Dm.2 Grz
Q
Q
Qs +


+


K4H
GL S4.1
?
S4.2
?
Dm
?
+










Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Qs
Q
Q
Qs +


S4
?
K4
?
K
?
Corollary 5. If zfc is consistent, then none of the modal theories S5,
S4W5, S4.3, S4.2.1, S4.1, Dm.2, Dm, K4H, GL or Grz are zfc-provable
principles of forcing, and all are invalid in L. The modal theories S4.1,
S4.2.1, K4H, GL and Grz are invalid as principles of forcing in every
model of set theory.
So if the zfc-provable principles of forcing constitute any previously
known modal theory, then the best remaining candidate is S4.2.
This article is intended primarily for two audiences: set theorists
interested in the fundamental principles of forcing and modal logicians
interested in the application of their subject to set theory. While we
felt it necessary in the arguments to assume a basic familiarity with
forcing, we do provide references to specific elementary forcing results
in the standard set theory graduate textbooks where this might be
helpful. We were able to provide in our arguments a complete account
of the necessary concepts from modal logic. Sections 2 and 3 cover
the proof of our Main Theorem 6, which answers our Main Question 2
above. Section 2 contains a complete proof of the main theorem writ-
ten primarily with the set theoretical reader in mind, and Section 3
emphasizes certain aspects of the proof for the modal logicians. After
this, we apply our technique fruitfully in Sections 4–6 to various other
instances of Main Question 2, by restricting the focus to a given model
of set theory, by investigating the role of parameters in the valid princi-
ples of forcing, and by restricting attention to a natural class of forcing
notions, such as those with the countable chain condition.
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2. The Main Theorem
Our main theorem provides an answer to Question 2.
Main Theorem 6. If zfc is consistent, then the zfc-provable prin-
ciples of forcing are exactly those in the modal theory S4.2.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem,
beginning with the key concepts of buttons and switches. A switch is
a statement ϕ of set theory such that both ϕ and ¬ϕ are necessarily
possible, so that by forcing ϕ can be switched on or off at will. For
example, the ch is a switch, because you can ensure either ch or ¬ch by
forcing over any model of set theory. In contrast, a button is a statement
that is (necessarily) possibly necessary. The button is pushed when it
is necessary, and otherwise unpushed. The idea is that you can always
push a button by making it necessary, but having done so, you cannot
unpush it again. The assertion “ωL1 is countable” is a button because
it can be forced over any model of set theory and once it becomes true
it remains true in all further extensions. This button is unpushed in L.
The reader is invited to check that a statement is possibly necessary if
and only if it is necessarily possibly necessary; at bottom, this amounts
to the S4.2 validity of 32ϕ ↔ 23 2ϕ. Thus, a button remains a
button in every forcing extension. Although it may seem at first that
buttons and switches are very special sorts of statements, we invite
the reader to check that in fact every statement in set theory is either
a button, the negation of a button, or a switch (and these types are
disjoint).
A collection of buttons bn and switches sm is independent in a model if
first, all the buttons are unpushed in the model and second, necessarily
(that is, in any forcing extension), any of the buttons can be pushed
and any of the switches can be switched without affecting the value of
any of the other buttons or switches. In other words, the collection of
buttons and switches is independent in W if the buttons are unpushed
inW , but in any forcing extensionW P, whatever the pattern of buttons
and switches is in W P, any button can be turned on by forcing to some
W P∗Q˙ without affecting the value of any of the other buttons or switches
and any switch can be turned either on or off by forcing to some W P∗R˙
without affecting the value of any of the other buttons or switches. It
follows, of course, that any finite pattern of buttons and switches being
on or off is possible by forcing over W .
We note that the counterexample substitution instances showing the
forcing invalidity of the modal assertions in Observation 4 were each
Boolean combinations of independent buttons and switches.
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Lemma 6.1. If V = L, then there is an independent collection of in-
finitely many buttons and infinitely many switches.
Proof. Let the button bn be the assertion “ω
L
n is not a cardinal,” and
let the switch sm be the assertion “the gch holds at ℵω+m.” If V = L,
then it is clear that none of the buttons is true, but in any model of
set theory, the button bn can be made true by collapsing ω
L
n , without
affecting the truth of any other button or the properties of the gch
above ℵω (see [Jec03, 15.21]). Once the button bn becomes true, it is
clearly necessary, because the cardinal ωLn will remain collapsed in any
further forcing extension. The switches sm are clearly switches, because
with forcing one can arrange the values of the continuum function at
ℵω+m at will by forcing that adds no new bounded sequences below ℵω
(see [Jec03, 15.18 & related]). Thus, the switches can be set to any
desired pattern without affecting any of the buttons. 
A lattice is a partial order such that any two nodes a and b have a
greatest lower bound or meet, denoted a ∧ b and a least upper bound
or join, denoted a ∨ b. It follows that every finite set A has a meet∧
A and join
∨
A, and that a finite lattice has a least and a greatest
element.
Lemma 6.2. If F is a finite lattice and W is a model of set theory
with a sufficiently large independent family of buttons bi, then to each
node w ∈ F we may assign an assertion pw, a Boolean combination of
the buttons, such that W satisfies:
(1) In any forcing extension, exactly one of the pw is true. And
W |= pw0, where w0 is the minimal node of F .
(2) In any forcing extension satisfying pw, the statement pv is force-
able if and only if w ≤ v in F .
Proof. Let us associate a button bu with each node u ∈ F . For any
A ⊆ F , let bA = (
∧
u∈A 2 bu) ∧ (
∧
u/∈A ¬2 bu) be the sentence asserting
that exactly the buttons in A are pushed and no others. Let pw =∨
{ bA | w =
∨
A } be the sentence asserting that the pattern of buttons
that have been pushed corresponds to a set A with least upper bound
w in F . Since every forcing extension must have some pattern A of
buttons bu pressed and every such A has a least upper bound in F , it
is clear that pw will be true in the model if and only if w is the least
upper bound of A. Thus, in any forcing extension exactly one of the
pw is true. And W |= pw0, as all buttons are unpushed in W .
For the second claim, suppose thatW [G] is a forcing extension where
pw holds. Let A = { u ∈ F |W [G] |= bu } be the set of buttons that are
pushed inW [G]. Since pw is true, it must be that w is the join of A in F .
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If w ≤ v in F , then by pushing the button bv and no others, we arrive
at a forcing extension W [G][H ] with buttons pushed in A∪ {v}. Since
this has join v, this means that pv is true in W [G][H ], and hence pv is
forceable in W [G], as desired. Conversely, suppose that pv is forceable
in W [G]. Thus, there is some further extension W [G][H ] satisfying pv.
This extension exhibits some pattern of buttons { bu | u ∈ B }, where
the join of B is v. Since W [G][H ] is a forcing extension of W [G], the
buttons in A remain pushed in W [G][H ], and so A ⊆ B. Thus, v must
be at least as large as the join of A, which is w, so w ≤ v in F . 
A pre-lattice is obtained from a lattice by replacing each node with a
cluster of one or more equivalent nodes, all related by ≤. Equivalently,
it is a partial pre-order ≤ (a reflexive and transitive relation) on a set
F , such that the quotient of F by the equivalence relation u ≡ v ↔
u ≤ v ≤ u is a lattice under the induced quotient relation ≤.
Lemma 6.3. If F is a finite pre-lattice and { bi, sj }i,j is a sufficiently
large finite independent family of buttons and switches in a model of
set theory W , then to each w ∈ F we may assign an assertion pw, a
Boolean combination of the buttons and switches, such that W satisfies:
(1) In any forcing extension, exactly one of the pw is true. And
W |= pw0 for any desired node w0 in the minimal cluster of F .
(2) In any forcing extension satisfying pw, the statement pv is force-
able if and only if w ≤ v in F .
Proof. The idea is to use the buttons as in Lemma 6.2 to determine
which cluster is intended in the quotient lattice, and then use the
switches to determine which node is intended within this cluster. Let
[u] denote the equivalence class of u in the quotient lattice F/≡, and
let p[u] be the label assigned to [u] in Lemma 6.2. Thus, p[u] is the dis-
junction of various complete patterns of buttons having supremum [u].
Suppose that the largest cluster of F has k nodes, and k ≤ 2n. For each
subset A ⊆ { 0, . . . , n− 1 } = n, let sA = (
∧
i∈A si) ∧ (
∧
i/∈A ¬si) assert
that the pattern of switches is specified by A. Since every pattern of
switches is possible by forcing over W , every sA is necessarily possible,
and in any forcing extension ofW , exactly one sA holds. For each clus-
ter [u], assign to every w ∈ [u] a nonempty set ~Aw = {A
w
0 , . . . , A
w
jw } of
subsets of n in such a way that the various ~Aw for w ∈ [u] partition the
subsets A ⊆ n. We may assign the pattern A of switches that happen
to hold in W to any desired node w0 in the minimal cluster of F . Let
sw =
∨
A∈ ~Aw
sA assert that the switches occur in a pattern appearing
in ~Aw. Finally, define pw = p[w] ∧ sw.
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We now prove that this works. In any forcing extension of W , we
know by Lemma 6.2 that exactly one p[u] is true. And any forcing
extension exhibits some pattern A of switches being true, and this A is
assigned to exactly one w ∈ [u], so exactly one sw is true for w ∈ [u].
Thus, in any forcing extension, exactly one pw = p[u] ∧ sw is true. We
arranged that pw0 is true in W by the assignment of the pattern of
switches holding in W to the world w0.
If W P is a forcing extension satisfying pw, then both p[w] and sw hold
in W P. If w ≤ v in F , then we already know that p[v] is forceable in
W P, and sv is forceable from any extension of W without affecting the
buttons, so pv = p[v] ∧ sv is forceable over W
P, as desired. Conversely,
if pv is forceable over W
P, this implies that p[v] is forceable over W
P,
and so [w] ≤ [v] in the quotient lattice. It follows that w ≤ v in F . 
We now state some definitions from modal logic. A propositional
world, also called a state, is a map of the propositional variables to the
set {true, false}. This is simply a row in a truth table. A Kripke model
M is a set U of propositional worlds, together with a relation R on U
called the accessibility relation. The Kripke semantics define when a
modal assertion ϕ is true at a world w in a Kripke model M , written
(M,w) |= ϕ. Namely, for atomic assertions, (M,w) |= q if q is true in
w; for Boolean connectives, one uses the usual inductive treatment; for
necessity, (M,w) |= 2ϕ if whenever w R v, then (M, v) |= ϕ; and for
possibility, (M,w) |= 3ϕ if there is v with w R v and (M, v) |= ϕ. The
underlying frame of the model M is the structure 〈U,R〉, ignoring the
internal structure of the elements of U . The reader may easily check
that every Kripke model whose frame is a partial pre-order satisfies
S4, and every Kripke model on a directed partial pre-order satisfies
S4.2. A deeper fact is Lemma 6.5, that the finite pre-lattice frames are
complete for S4.2. The next lemma is the heart of our argument, where
we prove that the behavior of any Kripke model on finite pre-lattice
can be exactly simulated by forcing.
Lemma 6.4. If M is a Kripke model whose frame is a finite pre-lattice
with a world w0 and W is a model of set theory with a sufficiently large
independent family of buttons and switches, then there is an assignment
of the propositional variables qi to set theoretical assertions ψi, such
that for any modal assertion ϕ we have
(M,w0) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) if and only if W |= ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn).
Proof. Each ψi will be a certain Boolean combination of the buttons
and switches. We have assumed that the frame F of M is a finite
pre-lattice. We may assume without loss of generality that w0 is an
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initial world of M , by ignoring the worlds not accessible from w0.
Let pw be the assertions assigned according to Lemma 6.3. Since
w0 is an initial world of F , we may ensure that W |= pw0 . Let
ψi =
∨
{ pw | (M,w) |= qi }. We will prove the lemma by establishing
the following stronger claim.
(M,w) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) if and only if W |= 2
(
pw → ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)
)
This is true for atomic ϕ, since qi is true at w if and only if pw is one
of the disjuncts of ψi, in which case pw → ψi in any forcing extension
of W , and conversely if pw → ψi is true in a forcing extension where
pw is true, then ψi must be true there, in which case qi is true at w
in M . If the statement is true for ϕ0 and ϕ1, then it is also true for
ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1. For negation, suppose that (M,w) |= ¬ϕ(q0, . . . , qn). By
induction, W 6|= 2(pw → ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)), so there is a forcing extension
W P satisfying pw and ¬ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). Since the truth values of ψi
necessarily depend only on the values of the various pu, it follows that
all forcing extensions with pw will satisfy ¬ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). So we have
proved W |= 2(pw → ¬ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)), as desired, and reversing the
steps establishes the converse. Finally, (M,w) |= 3ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) if
and only if ∃u ≥ w (M,u) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn), which occurs if and only
if W |= 2(pu → ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)). Since W |= 2(pw → 3 pu), this
implies W |= 2(pw → 3ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)), as desired. Conversely, if
W |= 2(pw → 3ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)), then ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) is forceable over
any extension of W with pw. Since all such extensions have pu for
some u ≥ w and the ψi depend only on the values of pv, it must be
that W |= 2(pu → ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) for some u ≥ w. By induction, this
is equivalent to (M,u) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) and consequently to (M,w) |=
3ϕ(q0, . . . , qn), as desired. 
The next step of our proof relies on a fact about S4.2. A tree is a
partial order ≤ on a set F such that the predecessors of any node are
linearly ordered. A pre-tree is a partial pre-order ≤ on a set F such that
the quotient F/≡ is a tree; each node of this tree is effectively replaced
in F with a cluster of equivalent nodes. A baled tree is a partial order
≤ on a set F having a largest node b ∈ F , such that F \ {b} is a tree
(imagine baling or tying the top branches of a tree together, as in the
figure below). A baled pre-tree is the result of replacing each node in a
baled tree with a cluster of equivalent nodes; equivalently, it is a partial
pre-order whose quotient by ≡ is a baled tree. Note that every baled
tree is a lattice, and every baled pre-tree is a pre-lattice. A partial
pre-order is directed if any two nodes have a common upper bound. A
modal logic Θ has the finite frame property if whenever Θ 6⊢ ϕ, then
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there is a finite Θ-frame F and a Kripke model having frame F in
which ϕ fails.
Lemma 6.5. If a modal assertion ϕ is not in S4.2, then it fails in
some Kripke model M whose frame is a finite baled pre-tree, and hence
a finite pre-lattice.
Proof. It is easy to see that every Kripke model whose frame is a di-
rected partial pre-order satisfies S4.2 and conversely that any frame
that is not a directed partial pre-order has a Kripke model violating
S4.2 (see [CZ97, Theorem 3.38]). This is what it means to say that
S4.2 is defined by the class of directed partial pre-orders. By [CZ97,
Theorem 5.33], it is known that S4.2 has the finite frame property, and
so if S4.2 6⊢ ϕ, then ϕ fails in a Kripke model M0 whose frame F0 is a
finite S4.2 frame, which is to say, a finite directed partial pre-order. We
will construct a Kripke model M that is bisimilar with M0, and which
consequently has the same modal theory, but whose frame is a finite
baled pre-tree, and consequently a finite pre-lattice. Our construction
is a minor modification of the standard technique of tree unravelling as
described in the proof of [CZ97, Theorem 2.19]. We know that ϕ fails
at some world w0 in M0, and we may assume that w0 is in the smallest
cluster of F0. By directedness, F0 has a largest cluster [b]. The quotient
F0/≡ is a finite directed partial order. For each [u] ∈ F0/≡, let us say
that t is a path from [w0] to [u] in F0/≡ if it is a maximal linearly
ordered subset of the interval [[w0], [u]] in F0/≡. Such paths form a
tree when ordered by end-extension. Let F be the partial unravelling
of F0, except for the largest cluster.
A partial order
6
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The resulting partial unravelling, a baled tree
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That is, F consists of the maximal cluster [b] of F0, together with the
set of all pairs 〈u, t〉, where t is a path from [w0] to [u] in F0/≡ and
[u] 6= [b]. The order on F is by end-extension of the paths t and the
F0 order on u, with [b] still maximal. The worlds within any copy of
a cluster are still equivalent and consequently still form a cluster, and
so F is a baled pre-tree. Let M be the resulting Kripke model on
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F , obtained by also copying the propositional values from every world
u ∈ F0 in M0 to the copies 〈u, t〉 of it in F . It is easy to see that
M is bisimilar with M0, according to the correspondence that we have
defined, because every world accesses in M all and only the copies of
the worlds that it accesses in M0. It follows that every world in M0
satisfies exactly the same modal truths in M0 that its copies satisfy
in M . Consequently, ϕ fails at the copy of w0 in M . Thus, ϕ fails
in a Kripke model whose frame is a finite baled pre-tree, and all such
frames are pre-lattices. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Finally, we prove the theorem. By Theorem 3, the
zfc-provable principles of forcing includes S4.2. If ϕ is not in S4.2, then
by Lemma 6.5, there is a Kripke modelM on a finite pre-lattice in which
ϕ fails at an initial world. It is well known that if zfc is consistent,
then so is zfc +V = L, and so by Lemma 6.1, there is a model of set
theory L having an infinite independent family of buttons and switches.
By Lemma 6.4, there is an assignment of the propositional variables of
ϕ to sentences ψi such that L |= ¬ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). Therefore, ϕ is not a
valid principle of forcing in L, and hence not a zfc-provable principle
of forcing. 
3. The Jankov-Fine formula
While the previous section was written with a set theoretical reader
in mind, let us now emphasize certain points for the modal logicians.
The main theorem can be restated in a way (as follows) that aligns it
with many other completeness theorems in modal logic.
Theorem 7. If zfc is consistent, then
S4.2 ⊢ ϕ(q0, . . . qn) if and only if ∀ψ0, . . . , ψn zfc ⊢ ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn),
where the ψi range over the sentences in the language of set theory and
2 and 3 are understood in zfc with the forcing interpretation.
Modal logicians will recognize that Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3 assert exactly
that the assertions pw fulfill the relevant Jankov-Fine formula, which we
now define. For any graph F = 〈U,E〉, assign a propositional variable
pw to each vertex w ∈ U of the graph and let δ(F ) be the following
formula, the Jankov-Fine formula. It asserts that, necessarily, exactly
one pw is true, and if pw is true, then 3 pv if and only if w E v.
δ(F ) = 2
∨
w∈U pw ∧
2
∧
w 6=v(pw → ¬pv) ∧
2
∧
wE v(pw → 3 pv) ∧
2
∧
¬wE v(pw → ¬3 pv)
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Lemma 6.4 has nothing essentially to do with set theory, but rather
only with Kripke models and the Jankov-Fine formula:
Lemma 7.1. Suppose that M is a Kripke model whose frame F is a fi-
nite partial pre-order and w0 is a world of M . If N is any other Kripke
model satisfying S4 (at some world u0) and the Jankov-Fine formula
δ(F ) ∧ pw0, then there is an assignment of the propositional variables
qi of M to assertions ψi in N such that for any modal assertion ϕ,
(M,w0) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) if and only if (N, u0) |= ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)
Proof. We argue just as in Lemma 6.4. Let pw be the assertions in
N satisfying the Jankov-Fine formula. Let ψi =
∨
{ pw | (N,w) |= qi }.
We establish the following stronger claim by induction on ϕ:
(M,w) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) ⇔ (N, u0) |= 2(pw → ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn)).
The atomic case holds by the definition of ψi. Conjunction follows
because 2 distributes over ∧. Negation follows via the properties of
the Jankov-Fine formula, because every world in N (accessible from
u0) satisfies exactly one pw, and any two such worlds agree on every
ψi. Possibility follows using the Jankov-Fine formula again, since pu is
possible from a world with pw if and only if w ≤ u in F . Finally, the
stronger claim implies the lemma, because pw0 is true at u0 in N . 
A modal theory Λ is closed under substitution if ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) is in Λ
whenever ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) is, for any modal assertions ψi. If every Kripke
model with frame F satisfies Λ, then F is a Λ-frame.
Lemma 7.2. Suppose that F is a finite partial pre-order. If a modal
theory Λ ⊇ S4 is closed under substitution and is consistent, for any
w0 ∈ F , with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F )∧pw0, then F is a Λ-frame.
Proof. If F is not a Λ-frame, then there is a Kripke model M with
frame F and some ϕ ∈ Λ such that (M,w0) |= ¬ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) for some
w0 ∈ F . If Λ is consistent with δ(F ) ∧ pw0 , then there is a Kripke
model satisfying (N, u0) |= Λ ∧ δ(F ) ∧ pw0. By Lemma 7.1, there is an
assignment qi 7→ ψi, where ψi is a Boolean combination of the pw in N ,
such that (N, u0) |= ¬ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). This contradicts a substitution
instance of (N, u0) |= Λ, since ϕ ∈ Λ. 
Similarly, the concepts of button and switch are not set theoretic;
they make sense in any Kripke model. Specifically, a button is a state-
ment that is necessarily possibly necessary, and a switch is a statement
such that it and its negation are necessarily possible. A family of
buttons {bi}i∈I and switches {sj}j∈J is independent in M at world u
if none of the buttons is necessary at u and necessarily, any button
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can be turned on and any switch can be turned either on or off with-
out affecting the other buttons and switches. This can be expressed
precisely in modal logic as follows. For any A ⊆ I and B ⊆ J , let
ΘA,B = (
∧
i∈A 2 bi)∧ (
∧
i/∈A ¬2 bi)∧ (
∧
j∈B sj)∧ (
∧
j /∈B ¬sj) assert that
the pattern of buttons and switches is specified by A and B. A family
{bi}i∈I ∪ {sj}j∈J of buttons and switches is independent if:
(∧
i∈I
¬2 bi
)
∧
∧
A ⊆ I
B ⊆ J
2
(
ΘA,B →
∧
A ⊆ A′
B′ ⊆ J
3ΘA′,B′
)
.
Thus, the buttons are off initially, and necessarily, from any possible
pattern of buttons and switches, any larger pattern of buttons and any
pattern of switches is possible. The main technique in our proofs of
Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3 appears to be very reminiscent of Smoryn´ski’s
[Smo93] proof of de Jongh’s theorem [dJ70] on Heyting’s Arithmetic.
Lemma 7.3. If F is a finite pre-lattice, w0 ∈ F and Λ ⊇ S4 is a
modal theory consistent with a sufficiently large independent family of
buttons and switches, then Λ is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula
δ(F ) ∧ pw0.
Proof. Suppose that (M,u0) |= Λ has a sufficiently large independent
family of buttons and switches. The proofs of Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3 work
in M . Specifically, in those arguments we assigned to each node w in
F an assertion pw, a Boolean combination of buttons and switches, so
that at any world u accessible from u0 in M , exactly one of the pw is
true, and if pw is true then 3 pv holds if and only if u ≤ v in F . Thus,
(M,u0) |= δ(F ). By assigning the pattern of switches that happens to
hold in M at u0 to the node w0, we also arranged (M,u0) |= pw0. So Λ
is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ pw0. 
The lemmas combine to prove Theorems 6 and 7 as follows. Let
Λ be the zfc-provable principles of forcing. It is easy to see that
Λ is closed under substitution, modus ponens and necessitation. By
Theorem 3, we know S4.2 ⊆ Λ. By Lemma 6.1, if zfc is consistent,
then there are models of set theory having infinite independent families
of buttons and switches. It follows that Λ is consistent with arbitrarily
large finite independent families of buttons and switches. By Lemma
7.3, therefore, Λ is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F )∧ pw0
for any finite pre-lattice F . By Lemma 7.2, therefore, all such F are
Λ-frames. By Lemma 6.5, any statement not in S4.2 fails in a Kripke
model having such a frame and consequently is not in Λ. So Λ ⊆ S4.2
and, consequently, Λ = S4.2.
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Let us now push these techniques a bit harder, in order to arrive at a
new class of frames complete for S4.2 and some useful characterizations
of S4, S4.2 and S5. A partial pre-order (B,≤) is a pre-Boolean algebra
if the quotient partial order B/≡ is a Boolean algebra.
Lemma 8. For any natural numbers n and m, there is a Kripke model
N whose frame is a finite pre-Boolean algebra, such that at any initial
world in N , there is an independent family of n buttons and m switches.
Proof. Using power sets, let F = P(n)× P(m), so that the nodes of F
consist of pairs (A,B), where A ⊆ n = { 0, . . . , n− 1 } and B ⊆ m =
{ 0, . . . , m− 1 }. The order is determined by the first coordinate only,
so that (A,B) ≤ (A′, B′) if and only if A ⊆ A′. This is clearly a partial
pre-order. The corresponding equivalence relation is (A,B) ≡ (A′, B′)
if and only if A = A′, and so the quotient is isomorphic to the power
set P(n), which is a finite Boolean algebra. So F is a finite pre-Boolean
algebra. Let N be the Kripke model on F in which bi true at (A,B)
when i ∈ B and sj true at (A,B) when j ∈ B. Clearly, every bi is a
button in N and every sj is a switch in N , and they are independent at
any initial world of N , because whatever the pattern (A,B) of buttons
and switches in any world of N , any larger pattern of buttons A′ ⊇ A
and any pattern of switches B′ ⊆ m is possible. 
The Kripke model N produced in Lemma 8 has the smallest frame
supporting an independent family of n buttons andm switches, because
for independence one one needs worlds realizing every pattern (A,B)
of buttons and switches. A class F of frames is complete for a modal
theory Λ if every F ∈ F is a Λ-frame and any ϕ true in all Kripke
models having frames in F is in Λ.
Lemma 9. A class F of frames is complete for S4.2 if and only if every
F ∈ F is an S4.2 frame and there are Kripke models, with frames in F,
for arbitrarily large finite independent families of buttons and switches.
Proof. The forward implication is immediate, because S4.2 is consistent
by Lemma 8 with the existence of large independent families of buttons
and switches. Conversely, suppose the latter property. If ϕ0 is not in
S4.2, then by Lemma 6.5 there is some Kripke modelM whose frame F
is a finite pre-lattice such that (M,w0) |= ¬ϕ0(q0, . . . , qn). Let (N, u0)
be a Kripke model with frame in F having an independent family of n
buttons and m switches, where n is the number of clusters in F and
the size of any cluster is at most 2m. By the proof of Lemma 7.3,
there are assertions pw for w ∈ F such that (N, u0) |= δ(F ) ∧ pw0 . By
Lemma 7.1, there is an assignment of the propositional variables qi of
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M to assertions ψi in N such that (M,w0) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) if and only
if (N, u0) |= ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). By the assumption on ϕ0, this means that
(N, u0) |= ¬ϕ0(ψ0, . . . , ψn). Thus, a substitution instance of ϕ0 fails
at a world in N , a Kripke model whose frame is in F. So this class of
frames is complete for S4.2. 
Theorem 10. The following sets of frames are complete for S4.2.
(1) Finite directed partial pre-orders.
(2) Finite pre-lattices.
(3) Finite baled pre-trees.
(4) Finite pre-Boolean algebras.
Proof. All of these frames are directed partial pre-orders, and so they
are all S4.2 frames. Lemma 6.5 shows that any statement not in S4.2
fails in a Kripke model whose frame is a finite baled pre-tree, and hence
a finite pre-lattice and a finite pre-order, so these classes are complete
for S4.2. The new part of this theorem is (4). By Lemma 8 the class
of finite pre-Boolean algebras have Kripke models for arbitrarily large
finite independent families of buttons and switches. So by Lemma 9,
this class is also complete for S4.2. 
Let us summarize what we have proved about S4.2:
Theorem 11. Suppose that the modal theory Λ contains S4 and is
closed under substitution. For any class F of finite frames complete for
S4.2, the following are equivalent:
(1) Λ is consistent with arbitrarily large finite independent families
of buttons and switches.
(2) Λ is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F )∧ pw for any
frame F ∈ F and world w ∈ F .
(3) Every frame in F is a Λ-frame.
(4) Λ ⊆ S4.2.
Proof. Lemma 7.2 shows that (2) implies (3), as the elements of F must
be finite directed partial pre-orders. For (3) implies (4), observe that
if ϕ /∈ S4.2, then it must fail in a Kripke model whose frame is in F,
contrary to (3). For (4) implies (2), note that S4.2 and δ(F ) ∧ pw0
are true together in the Kripke model having frame F , with pw true
exactly in world w. For (4) implies (1), if Λ ⊆ S4.2, then Λ is true in the
Kripke models constructed in Lemma 8, which have large independent
families of buttons and switches. Finally, Lemma 7.3 shows that (1)
implies (2) in the special case where F is the class of all finite pre-
lattices, and hence (1) implies (4) for any F, since they do not depend
on F, completing the proof. 
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Our later analysis will benefit from similar characterizations of S4
and S5. For S5, we use the fact that the class of finite complete reflexive
graphs are complete for S5. This result will be applied in Theorem 16.
Theorem 12. Suppose that a modal theory Λ contains S4 and is closed
under substitution. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) Λ is consistent with arbitrarily large finite independent families
of switches.
(2) Λ is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F )∧ pw for any
finite complete graph F and world w ∈ F .
(3) Every finite complete reflexive graph is a Λ-frame.
(4) Λ ⊆ S5.
Proof. For (1) implies (2), the point is that when F has only one cluster,
the argument of Lemma 6.3 does not require any buttons. Suppose that
N is a Kripke model having an independent family of switches {sj}j∈J .
For any A ⊆ J , define sA as in Lemma 6.3 to assert that the pattern
of switches is A. Partition the collection of A ⊆ J among the worlds
u ∈ F by assigning a nonempty set ~Au of sets to each world u in F .
Let su =
∧
A∈ ~Au
sA as in Lemma 6.3. By assigning whatever pattern of
switches holds at u0 to the world w, we can arrange that (N, u0) |= sw.
Since every world must have some unique pattern of switches, it follows
that (M,u0) satisfies that necessarily, exactly one su is true. And since
the switches are independent, we also know that (M,u0) |= 2 su for
any u ∈ F . Since all worlds in F are accessible from each other, this
implies (N, u0) |= δ(F ) ∧ pw, as desired.
Lemma 7.2 shows that (2) implies (3). And (3) implies (4) because
any statement not in S5 is known to fail in a Kripke model whose
frame is a finite complete reflexive graph (see [CZ97, Proposition 3.32,
Corollary 5.29]). Finally, if Λ ⊆ S5, then Λ holds in any Kripke model
whose frame is a complete graph. It is easy to arrange independent
families of switches in such Kripke models, just by ensuring that every
possible pattern of switches is exhibited in some world. 
In the S4 context, one can generalize Theorems 11 and 12 to the
following, which we expect will be relevant for Conjecture 35. Recall
that a modal logic Θ has the finite frame property if whenever Θ 6⊢ ϕ,
then there is a finite Θ-frame F and a Kripke model M with frame F
in which ϕ fails. Such theories as S4, S4.2, S4.3 and S5 are known by
[CZ97, 5.29, 5.32, 5.33] to have the finite frame property.
Theorem 13. Suppose that Θ is a modal logic containing S4 and has
the finite frame property, such as S4, S4.2, S4.3 or S5. If Λ contains
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S4 and is closed under substitution, then for any class F of frames
complete for Θ, the following are equivalent:
(1) Λ is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F )∧pw0 for any
frame F ∈ F and world w0 ∈ F .
(2) Every frame in F is a Λ-frame.
(3) Λ ⊆ Θ.
Proof. If the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ pw0 holds in a Kripke model
(N, u0) |= Λ, then by Lemma 7.1, any Kripke model M with frame F
has an assignment qi 7→ ψi such that (M,w0) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn) if and
only if (N, u0) |= ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). In particular, if ϕ fails in such an M ,
then the corresponding substitution instance of it will fail in N |= Λ.
So every such F is a Λ-frame, and we have proved (1) implies (2). For
(2) implies (3), observe that if ϕ is not in Θ, then it fails in a Kripke
model M having a finite frame F ∈ F. Since F is a Λ-frame, we know
M |= Λ and consequently ϕ is not in Λ. So Λ ⊆ Θ. For (3) implies (1),
observe that the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F )∧ pw0 is easily satisfied at a
Kripke model M having frame F , where pw is true exactly at w. Since
F is a Θ-frame, we know M |= Θ and consequently M |= Λ by (3), so
(1) holds, and the proof is complete. 
We do not have a button-and-switch characterization of S4 in The-
orem 13, because the frame of an S4 model need not be directed, and
it is not true that every possibly necessary statement is necessarily
possibly necessary. Under S4, one can have assertions ϕ such that, si-
multaneously, ϕ is possibly necessary, ¬ϕ is possibly necessary, and ϕ
is possibly a switch. Thus, for the S4 context, we emphasize the official
definition of button as a statement that is necessarily possibly neces-
sary. Such examples show that unlike S4.2, under S4 it is no longer
true that every statement is a button, the negation of a button or a
switch.
4. Forcing over a fixed model of set theory
While our main theorem establishes that the zfc-provable principles
of forcing are exactly those in S4.2, it is not true that every model of
set theory observes only these validities. For any W |= zfc, recall
that a modal assertion ϕ is a valid principle of forcing in W if for all
sentences ψi in the language of set theory we have W |= ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn).
For meta-mathematical reasons connected with Tarski’s theorem on
the non-definability of truth, there is initially little reason to expect
that the collection of such ϕ should be definable in W ; rather, the
assertion that ϕ is valid in W is expressed as a scheme, asserting all
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substitution instances ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) inW . So this is formally a second-
order notion. Because a statement is provable in zfc exactly when it
holds in all models of zfc, our main theorem establishes that the modal
assertions ϕ that are valid in all models of set theory are exactly those
in S4.2. Our proof, however, established the following stronger result.
Theorem 14. If W is a model of set theory with arbitrarily large finite
independent families of buttons and switches, then the valid principles
of forcing in W are exactly S4.2.
This result is stronger because it shows that the minimal set of forc-
ing validities is realized in a single model of set theory (such as any
model of V = L), rather than arising as the intersection of the validities
of several models. Nevertheless, there are models of set theory whose
valid principles of forcing go beyond S4.2. For example, the Maximality
Principle mp of [Ham03] asserts all instances of the scheme 32ψ → ψ,
so that any set theoretic statement ψ that holds in some forcing ex-
tension and all further extensions is already true. In other words, mp
asserts that S5 is valid for forcing. Because it is established in [Ham03]
that if zfc is consistent, then so is zfc+mp, we conclude:
Theorem 15. If zfc is consistent, then it is consistent with zfc that
all S5 assertions are valid principles of forcing.
The forcing validities of a model, however, never go beyond S5.
Theorem 16. The valid principles of forcing in any model of set theory
are included within S5.
Proof. Let Λ be the set of forcing validities in a model W of set theory.
By Theorem 3, this includes all of S4.2. Also, Λ is easily seen to be
closed under substitution. Observe next that any model of set theory
has an infinite independent family of switches, such as sn =“the gch
holds at ℵn.” These and their negations are forceable in any finite
pattern over any model of set theory by well known forcing arguments.
It follows that Λ is consistent with the modal assertions that there are
large independent families of switches. By Theorem 12, consequently,
Λ ⊆ S5. 
Corollary 17. If zfc is consistent, then there is a model of set theory
whose valid principles of forcing are exactly S5.
Our results establish that both S4.2 and S5 are realized as the exact
set of forcing validities of a model of set theory (realized, respectively,
in models of V = L or of mp).
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Question 18. Which modal theories arise as the valid principles of
forcing in a model of zfc?
For example, can there be a model of set theory whose valid principles
of forcing are exactly Dm.2 or exactly S4.3? We have seen that if
a model of set theory has sufficiently many independent buttons and
switches, then the valid principles of forcing will be only S4.2. At the
other extreme, if there are no buttons, then mp holds and so the valid
principles of forcing in the model will be S5. Is it possible to have
a model with a finite bound on the size of an independent family of
buttons?
Question 19. Is there a model of zfc with one unpushed button but
not two independent buttons?
What are the valid principles of forcing in such models? It is clear
that if there are only finitely many buttons in a model (meaning that
the independent families of buttons have some bounded finite size),
then we could use Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4 to simulate any Kripke model
on a pre-lattice frame with a correspondingly bounded number of clus-
ters. The various classes of such frames generate modal theories strictly
between S4.2 and S5. Are these realizable as the forcing validities of
models of set theory? Are these the only modal theories that arise?
The next theorem is a start on these questions. Denote the collection
of modal assertions ϕ that are valid in W by ForceW . Two buttons b0
and b1 are semi-independent if both are unpushed and one can push b0
without pushing b1.
Theorem 20. Suppose that W is a model of zfc set theory.
(1) S4.2 ⊆ ForceW ⊆ S5.
(2) If W has no unpushed buttons, then ForceW = S5.
(3) If W has at least one unpushed button, then ForceW ( S5.
(4) If W has two semi-independent buttons, then W5 is not valid
in W , and so S4W5 6⊆ ForceW .
(5) If W has two independent buttons, then .3 is not valid in W ,
and so S4.3 6⊆ ForceW .
(6) If W has an independent family of one button and one switch,
then Dm is not valid in W , and so Dm 6⊆ ForceW .
Proof. Statement (1) is the content of Theorems 3 and 16. Over S4,
the additional S5 axiom is equivalent to 32ϕ → 2ϕ, which exactly
asserts that every button is pushed. So (2) and (3) hold. For (4),
suppose that b0, b1 are semi-independent buttons in W , and let ϕ =
(¬2 b0 ∧ ¬2 b1) ∨ 2(b0 ∧ b1), which asserts that either none or both
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buttons are pushed. Thus, ϕ is both true and possibly necessary in
W , since the buttons are initially unpushed and we could push both,
but ϕ is not necessary, since we could push just b0; this violates W5.
For (5), suppose that W has two independent buttons b1 and b2. We
argue as in Observation 4. Let ϕ = 2 b1∧¬2 b2 and ψ = 2 b2∧¬2 b1.
Since both buttons are unpushed in W and either may be pushed, we
conclude that W |= 3ϕ ∧ 3ψ. But in any forcing extension of W , if
ϕ is true, then ψ is impossible and vice versa. So this instance of the
conclusion of .3 fails in W . Thus, .3 is not valid in W , and so ForceW
does not include S4.3. For (6), suppose that W has an independent
family of one button b and one switch s. We follow the argument of
Observation 4, case Dm. We may assume that both 2 b and s are false
inW . Let ϕ = 2 b∨s. This is possibly necessary inW , since one could
push the button b, but not true in W , so 32ϕ → ϕ is false in W .
In any forcing extension of W , if 2(ϕ → 2ϕ), then it must be that
the button b has been pushed there, since otherwise one could have ϕ
true and then false again by flipping the switch s. So we have argued
that (2(ϕ→ 2ϕ))→ ϕ holds in every forcing extension of W . Thus,
the hypothesis of this instance of Dm holds in W , while the conclusion
fails, so Dm is not valid in W . This establishes (6). 
Semi-independent buttons are part of the following more general ar-
rangement. A list of assertions ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is a volume control if each
is a button, pushing any of them necessarily also pushes all the previ-
ous, and any of them can be pushed without pushing the next. More
precisely:
2
∧
i<n
(2ϕi+1 → 2ϕi) ∧ (3 2ϕi+1) ∧
(
¬2ϕi+1 → 3(¬ϕi+1 ∧ 2ϕi)
)
.
The idea is that one can turn up the volume to level j by forcing
2ϕj, but there is no turning it down again. The volume control has
volume zero if ¬2ϕ1 (and so a volume control of length n has n + 1
many volume settings). These volume controls exhibit dependence of
buttons, in a linear fashion, rather than independence. If buttons b0
and b1 are semi-independent, then 2 b0, 2(b0 ∧ b1) is a volume control
of length 2; conversely, every volume control of length 2 (and volume
zero) consists of two semi-independent buttons. Similar ideas with
more buttons produce arbitrarily long volume controls. A Kripke model
with a linear frame of n+1 clusters admits volume controls of length n
but no independent buttons. A family of volume controls, buttons and
switches is independent in a model if all the volume controls have zero
volume in that model, all the buttons are unpushed in that model, and
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in any forcing extension, one can operate any of the volume controls,
buttons and switches without affecting any of the others.
Theorem 21. If W is a model of set theory exhibiting arbitrarily long
volume controls independent from arbitrarily large families of indepen-
dent switches, then ForceW ⊆ S4.3.
Proof. We know by [CZ97, 3.31, 3.32, 3.40, 5.33] that the finite linear
pre-orders are a complete class of S4.3 frames. Suppose that F is such a
finite linear pre-order and w0 is a node in the minimal cluster of F . Let
v1, . . . , vn be a volume control in W , where n is the number of clusters
of F , and suppose that this volume control forms an independent family
with the switches s0, . . . , sm, where the size of any cluster is at most
2m. As in Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3, we will assign to each node w ∈ F an
assertion pw, so that W satisfies the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ pw0.
Specifically, within each cluster [u], assign to each node w ∈ [u] a
nonempty set ~Aw of subsets A ⊆ n in such a way that these partition
all subsets A ⊆ n, and define sw =
∨
A∈ ~Aw
sA, as in Lemma 6.3. In the
least cluster, we assign the pattern A of switches holding in W to the
node w0. Now, for any node w ∈ F , if w is in the i
th cluster, then we
define pw = vi ∧ sw. That is, the volume control indicates the intended
cluster and the switch indicates the intended node within that cluster.
Since every forcing extension of W exhibits some volume setting and
some pattern of switches, it is clear that it will satisfy exactly one of
the pw, and in any extension of W where pw holds, then 3 pv holds
if and only if w ≤ v. Thus, the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ pw0 is
satisfied. It now follows by Theorem 13 that F is a ForceW -frame. So
every S4.3-frame is a ForceW -frame, and so ForceW ⊆ S4.3. 
We close this section with a curious question. A modal theory is nor-
mal if it is closed under modus ponens, substitution and necessitation.
All the named modal theories that we have considered, such as S4, S4.2,
S4.3, Dm.2, S5 and so on, are normal. Meanwhile, the valid principles
of forcing in any model of zfc is easily seen to be closed under modus
ponens and substitution. But is it closed under necessitation?
Question 22. If ϕ is a valid principle of forcing, does it remain valid
in all forcing extensions?
In other words, is 2ϕ also valid? Equivalently, if W |= zfc, then is
ForceW normal? Of course, if ForceW is S4.2 or S5, then the answer is
yes, so this question is related to Questions 18 and 25.
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5. The modal logic of forcing with parameters
We know from [Ham03] that parameters play a subtle role in the
strength of the Maximality Principles. While mp is equiconsistent with
zfc, allowing real parameters in the scheme results in the principle
mp(R), which has some large cardinal strength; allowing uncountable
parameters leads to inconsistency. Allowing real parameters from all
forcing extensions leads to a principle 2mp(R) with a large cardinal
strength of at least infinitely many Woodin cardinals (but less than
adR + Θ is regular). So let us analyze the role played by parameters
in the valid principles of forcing. Specifically, define that ϕ(q0, . . . , qn)
is a valid principle of forcing in a model W with parameters in X if for
any set theoretical formulas ψi(~x) we have
W |= ∀~x ∈ X ϕ(ψ0(~x), . . . , ψn(~x)).
We denote the collection of such ϕ by ForceW (X). The next theorem
provides another answer to Question 2.
Theorem 23. In any model of set theory, the modal assertions ϕ that
are valid principles of forcing with all parameters are exactly those in
S4.2. Succinctly, ForceW (W ) = S4.2.
Proof. Certainly any S4.2 assertion is a valid principle of forcing with
any parameters, by the argument of Theorem 3, which did not depend
on whether there were parameters or not. For the converse direction,
we argue as in the Main Theorem, using the following fact, that with
sufficient parameters one can always construct independent families of
buttons and switches.
Lemma 23.1. If W is any model of zfc, then with parameters ωWn for
n ∈ ω, there is an infinite independent family of buttons and switches.
Proof. Let bn be the assertion “ω
W
n+1 is not a cardinal” and let sm be
“the gch holds at ℵω+m,” referring to ℵω+m de dicto, rather than with
a parameter. In any forcing extension of W , any of the buttons can be
forced without affecting the truth of the other buttons, by collapsing
ωWn+1 to its predecessor (see [Jec03, 15.21]). After this, the switches
sm and their negations can be forced in any desired pattern without
adding bounded sets below ℵω and, consequently, without affecting the
buttons bn (see [Jec03, 15.18 & related]). 
The result now follows from Theorem 14 and the observation that the
existence of parameters can simply be carried through that argument.
Specifically, if ϕ is not in S4.2, then it fails at some world w0 in a Kripke
model M whose frame is a finite pre-lattice. As in the Main Theorem,
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we use the buttons and switches to define pw for each world w in M
verifying the Jankov-Fine formula as in Lemma 6.3. If we define ψi as
in Lemma 6.4, then we observe as before that (M,w0) |= ϕ(q0, . . . , qn)
if and only if W |= ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn). Since ϕ fails at w0 in M and the ψi
are Boolean combinations of the buttons and switches, this produces a
failing substitution instance of ϕ in W using the same parameters. 
Theorem 24. For any W |= zfc and any set X of parameters in W ,
S4.2 ⊆ ForceW (X) ⊆ ForceW ⊆ S5.
If X ⊆ Y , then
S4.2 ⊆ ForceW (Y ) ⊆ ForceW (X) ⊆ ForceW ⊆ S5.
Proof. Certainly any S4.2 assertion is valid, even with parameters, so
S4.2 ⊆ ForceW (X). The proof of Theorem 16 is not affected by the
presence of parameters, so ForceW (X) ⊆ S5. If X ⊆ Y , then it is
at least as hard for a modal assertion ϕ to be valid for all substi-
tution instances using parameters in Y as for parameters in X, so
ForceW (Y ) ⊆ ForceW (X). Finally, ForceW = ForceW (∅). 
Question 25. Can the set of forcing validities ForceW (X) be strictly
between S4.2 and S5? When is it equal to S4.2 or to S5?
For example, in the proof of Theorem 23, we only used parameters
ωWn , so we may conclude:
Corollary 26. For any model W of set theory, ForceW (ℵWω ) = S4.2.
More specifically, ForceW ({ωWn | n ∈ ω }) = S4.2.
Corollary 27. If a model W of set theory is absolutely definable in
all forcing extensions (by the same formula, without parameters), then
ForceW = S4.2.
Proof. If W is absolutely definable, then the ωWn are also absolutely
definable, thereby avoiding in Theorem 23 the need for them to appear
explicitly as parameters. 
An essentially identical argument shows, more generally, that if W
is absolutely definable from parameters in X, then ForceW (X) = S4.2.
In particular, no such W is a model of the Maximality Principle. We
now push the parameters a bit lower. Let Hω2 denote the collection of
sets having hereditary size less than ω2.
Theorem 28. For any model W of set theory, ForceW (Hω2) = S4.2.
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Proof. We will build an independent family of buttons and switches.
In W , let ω1 =
⊔
n Sn be a partition of ω1 into infinitely many disjoint
stationary subsets Sn. Let bn assert “Sn is not stationary”. Each
assertion bn is false in W , since the Sn are stationary there, but in
any forcing extension, by shooting a club through the complement of
any Sn, we can force bn to be necessary, while preserving all stationary
subsets of the complement of Sn (see [Jec03, 23.8, ex. 23.6]). Thus, in
any forcing extension of W , we can push button bn without affecting
any of the other buttons. (Note that this forcing collapses ω1 when Sn
is the sole remaining stationary set on the list.) So the buttons bn are
independent in W . For switches, let sk assert that the gch holds at
ℵk+2. By forcing over W or any extension we can arrange the switches
in any finite pattern, without adding subsets to ωW1 and consequently
without affecting the buttons. SoW has an infinite independent family
of buttons and switches using parameters in Hω2 , and so by Theorem
14 we conclude ForceW (HWω2 ) = S4.2. 
This stationary set idea provides an alternative source of indepen-
dent buttons for Lemma 6.1, because if V = L, then one can use the
L-least partition of ω1 into ω many stationary sets; one advantage
here is that this provides arbitrarily large finite independent families of
buttons that can be pushed without collapsing cardinals. Indeed, the
button to collapse ωL1 is equivalent to the infinite conjunction of these
independent buttons.
Returning to Question 25, we observe that if W is a model of V = L
or if ForceW = S4.2, then clearly all the classes line up on the left
side with ForceW (X) = S4.2. If W |= mp, then ForceW = S5 is
on the right. If W |= mp(R), then ForceW (R) = S5. If X has any
uncountable parameter x, then the assertion ψ = “x is countable” is
possibly necessary but not true in W ; consequently, 32ψ → ψ fails in
W , and so ForceW (X) 6= S5. More generally, if X has an element from
which ωW1 is absolutely definable, then Force
W (X) 6= S5. In fact, since
ch is always a switch and independent from “ωV1 is countable,” we can
conclude in this case that Dm is not valid, so Dm 6⊆ ForceW (X). If
the set of parameters supports long volume controls with independent
switches, then ForceW (X) ⊆ S4.3. If it supports many independent
buttons and switches, then ForceW (X) = S4.2. The situation S4.2 (
ForceW (X) ( S5 would occur if one could construct at least one button
inW using parameters inX, but not arbitrarily large finite independent
families of buttons and switches.
The hypothesis S5 ⊆ ForceW (R) is equivalent to W |= mp(R), which
has large cardinal consistency strength. Specifically, [Ham03] shows
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it to be equiconsistent over zfc with the existence of a stationary
proper class of inaccessible cardinals. It is natural to inquire about the
strength of weaker hypotheses concerning ForceW (R). For example, we
prove next that Dm ⊆ ForceW (R) already has large cardinal strength.
Define that ω1 is inaccessible to reals if ω1 is an inaccessible cardinal
in L[x] for every real x (equivalently, if ω
L[x]
1 < ω1 for all x ∈ R). The
assertion that there is a stationary proper class of inaccessible cardinals
is expressed as a scheme in zfc, asserting that every class of ordinals
(definable from parameters) that is closed and unbounded in the class
of all ordinals, contains an inaccessible cardinal.
Theorem 29. If Dm is valid for forcing with real parameters, then ω1
is inaccessible to reals and every L[x] for x ∈ R has a stationary proper
class of inaccessible cardinals. Indeed, Lω1 ≺ L and even Lω1[x] ≺ L[x].
Proof. We show Lω1 ≺ L by verifying the Tarski-Vaught criterion. This
claim should be understood metatheoretically and proved as a scheme.
Suppose that L |= ∃v ψ(u, v) where u ∈ Lω1. If there is no such v inside
Lω1, then the assertion ϕ(u) =“there is v ∈ Lω1 such that L |= ψ(u, v)”
is false in W . But it is certainly forceably necessary, because we could
make ϕ(u) true by collapsing cardinals until the least witness v in L
is hereditarily countable. In other words, ϕ(u) is a button in W . The
parameter u, being in Lω1 , is hereditarily countable and can therefore
be coded with a real. Meanwhile, the assertion ch is a switch, and this
switch is independent of ϕ(u), because the ch and its negation can
be forced over any model without collapsing ω1 and therefore without
affecting the truth of ϕ(u). Since we have an independent button and
switch in W using a real parameter, it follows by Theorem 20, case
(6), that Dm is not valid in W with real parameters, contrary to our
assumption that Dm is valid for forcing over W with real parameters.
By relativizing to any real x, we similarly conclude Lω1 [x] ≺ L[x],
again proved as a scheme. It follows by elementary set theory that
ω1 is (strongly) inaccessible in L[x]. Also, if C ⊆ ord is a definable
proper class club in L[x], it follows that C ∩ ω1 is unbounded in ω1,
and consequently ω1 ∈ C. Thus, the class of inaccessible cardinals in
L[x] is a stationary proper class, as claimed. 
Corollary 30. The following are equiconsistent over zfc:
(1) zfc+mp(R).
(2) zfc+ S5 with real parameters is valid for forcing.
(3) zfc+ S4W5 with real parameters is valid for forcing.
(4) zfc+ Dm.2 with real parameters is valid for forcing.
(5) zfc+ Dm with real parameters is valid for forcing.
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(6) zfc+ there is a stationary proper class of inaccessible cardinals.
Proof. The Maximality Principle mp(R) asserts exactly that Axiom 5
is valid for forcing with real parameters, so (1) ↔ (2). Clearly (2) →
(3) → (4) → (5), since S5 ⊇ S4W5 ⊇ Dm.2 ⊇ Dm. In fact, (4) ↔ (5),
since the axiom .2 is always valid. Statement (5) implies, by Theorem
29, that (6) is true in L. Finally, if there is a model where (6) holds,
then results in [Ham03] produce a model satisfying zfc+mp(R). 
The assertions in Corollary 30 should be understood as schemes as-
serting the relevant substitution instances ∀~x ∈ R ϕ(ψ0(~x), . . . , ψn(~x)).
Question 31. Which modal theories arise as the valid principles of
forcing with real parameters?
We know that S4.2 ⊆ ForceW (R) ⊆ S5, and both of these endpoints
can occur. But is there any model of set theory W giving rise to any
intermediate modal theory?
6. Restricting to a class of forcing notions
One can naturally restrict the scope of forcing extensions to those
obtained by the members of a particular class Γ, so that 2Γ ϕ means
that ϕ holds in all forcing extensions by forcing in Γ and 3Γ ϕ means
that ϕ is forceable by some forcing in Γ. Natural classes Γ would
include ccc forcing, proper forcing, and so on. The analogue of the
Main Question becomes:
Question 32. For a given class of forcing Γ, what are the valid prin-
ciples of Γ forcing?
There are many open questions here, which we leave for future
projects. Let us close the paper by observing that even with ccc
forcing, the situation changes dramatically.
Theorem 33. If zfc is consistent, then the zfc-provable principles
of ccc forcing do not include S4.2.
Proof. It is easy to deduce in S4.2 the following Directedness axiom:
(32ϕ ∧3 2ψ)→ 32(ϕ ∧ ψ).
We will show that the ccc interpretation of this Directedness axiom
is not valid in L. This proof relies on the fact, a part of mathematical
folklore, that there are two fundamentally different ways to destroy a
Suslin tree by ccc forcing. If T is a Suslin tree, then of course forc-
ing with T itself adds a branch through T , making it non-Aronszajn.
Alternatively, if T is Suslin, then there is ccc forcing making T into
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a special Aronszajn tree, a union of countably many antichains (see
[Jec03, 16.19 & related]). No further forcing can add a branch through
this tree without collapsing ω1, since the branch would have to contain
at most one node from each antichain. Thus, these two alternatives
cannot be amalgamated by ccc forcing. If ϕ is the assertion “the L-
least Suslin tree is not Aronszajn” and ψ is the assertion “the L-least
Suslin tree is special,” then each of these statements is possibly nec-
essary by ccc forcing over L, but their conjunction is false in all ccc
extensions of L. Thus, (3ccc 2ccc ϕ) ∧ (3ccc 2ccc ψ) holds in L, but
not 3ccc 2ccc(ϕ ∧ ψ), violating Directedness. 
Corollary 34. The same conclusion holds for any class Γ of forcing no-
tions containing all ccc forcing, whose members in any ccc extension
preserve ω1. This includes the classes of proper forcing, semi-proper
forcing, cardinal-preserving forcing, and so on.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 33, the assertions ϕ and ψ are each
ccc-forceably necessary in L and hence Γ-forceably necessary there,
but the conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ is not forceable by ω1-preserving forcing
over L, and hence not Γ-forceable over L. So the Γ-forcing validities in
L do not include S4.2. 
Nevertheless, one can easily verify that S4 remains valid for ccc
forcing (and also for the other classes), and we conjecture that they do
not go beyond this.
Conjecture 35. The zfc-provable principles of ccc forcing are ex-
actly S4.
A complete set of S4 Kripke frames consists of finite pre-trees (partial
pre-orders whose quotients are trees), and with them one might try to
carry out a similar analysis as in our Main Theorem, by finding set
theoretical assertions to fulfill the Jankov-Fine assertions. The point
is that branching in these trees gives rise to behavior totally unlike
either buttons or switches. Branching corresponds in set theory to the
possibility of ccc forcing extensions that cannot be amalgamated by
further ccc forcing, as in the folklore fact above, where one chooses
either to specialize a Suslin tree of L or to make it not Aronszajn.
What is needed, therefore, is an elaborate generalization of this folklore
idea, in which one can successively make choices with ccc forcing that
cannot later be amalgamated by ccc forcing, in such a way that every
ccc forcing extension is included.
Under Martin’s Axiom ma, of course, the product of ccc posets is
again ccc, and this implies that the Directedness Axiom is valid for
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ccc forcing. As a consequence, all S4.2 assertions are valid for ccc
forcing over any model of ma. We conjecture that this also is optimal.
To prove this, one would need to find a model of ma with arbitrarily
large finite independent families of ccc buttons and switches.
Conjecture 36. The zfc+ma provable principles of ccc forcing are
exactly S4.2.
Lastly, we mention that for ccc forcing, unlike the general situation
with Corollary 30, there is no large cardinal strength to the hypothesis
that S5 is valid for ccc forcing with real parameters. Specifically,
[Lei04] proves that if zfc is consistent, then there is a model of zfc in
which every S5 assertion is valid for ccc forcing with real parameters.
If one wants S5 to be valid for ccc forcing with parameters in H2ω ,
however, then [Ham03] shows that it is equiconsistent, as in Corollary
30, with a stationary proper class of inaccessible cardinals.
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